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Attention: Pit Bull Terrier Owners
As you may be aware, there are new laws in effect concern-
ing the maintenance of pit bull terriers in the state of Ohio. In
an effort to alert and educate you, the owner, keeper or harborer,
the following analysis of the law is being provided for you....
Pit bull terriers make up 1% of the dog population in the United
States. However, they are responsible for 67% of the deaths
caused by dogs. It is these types of statistics which prompted the
state of Ohio to create legislature [sic] directed to this problem.
The criminal penalties under this bill ranges [sic] from a misde-
meanor in the fourth degree to a felony in the fourth degree
I. INTRODUCTION
The prevalence of pit bull dog attacks in the state of Ohio and
throughout the country has created a furor regarding that type of dog. The
Ohio legislature reacted to this situation by passing a new vicious dog
statute which was signed into effect on July 10, 1987? Ohio Revised Code
section 955.11 was deemed necessary to correct the problem with pit bull
dogs by revising the prior dog law concerning ownership or keeping of dogs
IExcerpt from the letter addressed to each person suspected to be a pit bull
dog owner in Mahoning County, Ohio by the county dog warden. The letter, dated
August 10, 1987 and addressed solely to the owners of pit bull terriers outlined
the various provisions of the newly enacted Am. Sub. H.B. No. 352.1 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 955.11 (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
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in Ohio.' The statute was introduced as an emergency provision to preserve
public safety as a result of numerous incidents, both in Ohio and nation-
wide, where dangerous or vicious dogs caused severe injury or death to
individuals. The Act was initially intended to apply to all dogs without
regard to breed on the basis of their dangerous or vicious propensities, but
was amended to specifically designate pit bull dogs as vicious. Consequent-
ly, pit bull dogs achieved the dubious honor of being the only breed to be
specifically mentioned as prima facie vicious in the text of the statute.4
Breeders associations, pit bull owners and other enforcement officials
who deal with the dogs on a regular basis are disturbed by the specific
mention of pit bull dogs in the newly enacted statute. They argue that any
breed or mixed breed can become a "renegade" or "bad dog." The root of
the problem is man made. It is a result of human interference with the
natural propensities of the animals to create excellent guard dogs, fighting
machines, or whatever suits man's purpose.
The constitutionality of the statute has been called into question for
several reasons, largely because it appears to be an attempt to eradicate
pit bull dogs, rather than to control the problems caused by all dangerous
and vicious dogs, and because of questionable enforcement methods.5 This
Note will explore the background of the pit bull dog problem and examine
allegations that the new statute is unconstitutional. It will then propose
alternative legislation and enforcement methods for controlling all dogs
without the necessity of singling out specific breeds.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE PIT BULL DOG PROBLEM
Pit bull dogs and attacks associated with them have caught the atten-
tion of the public through extensive media coverage in newspapers and
television.6 In Ohio, the introduction of Ohio Revised Code section 955.11
3 The Act amended OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 715.23, 955.11, 955.20, 955.25,
955.26,955.28,955.44 and 955.99 (Baldwin 1953) and enacted Omo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 955.21 and 955.261 relative to the transfer and control of dangerous, vicious,
and other dogs, the quarantine of certain dogs, the right to kill certain dogs, and
related criminal penalties, and to declare an emergency.
'Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.11(AX4XaXBaldwin Supp. 1987).
Methods of enforcement such as the letter sent out by the Mahoning County
Dog Warden and allegedly arbitrary seizure of dogs not necessarily pit bull dogs,
along with an intent to decimate the pit bull dog population are among the many
things alleged in the complaint in Ohio Dog Breeders Ass'n v. Celeste, No.
C87-2708Y (N.D. Ohio Oct. 14, 1987).
6 The subject of pit bull dog attacks attained coverage in a number of media
sources. For instance, the television documentary show West 57th (CBS television
broadcast, Jan. 9, 1988) covered pit bull dogs. Magazines addressed to children have
also covered the topic. Fox, The Problem With Pit Bulls, Boys LinE, Jan. 1988, at
16 (hereinafter Fox]. Michael Fox is the scientific director of the Humane Society
of the United States. Magazines designed to aid legislators and local law makers
in formulating the law have published articles to assist them in dealing with the
perceived pit bull dog problem. Some Dogs Will No Longer Get Their Day, GOVERN-
ING, Oct. 1987, at 10-11. Even advice columnists have seen fit to address the prob-
lem in their columns. Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 3, 1987, at G-9.
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was spurred by publicity and concern surrounding the pit bull attack which
killed a retired physician in Dayton, Ohio on April 6, 1987.1 Such media
coverage has contributed to pit bull dogs' fearsome reputation. A brief
history of the pit bull terrier may help explain some of the fear associated
with the animal. The lineage of pit bull dogs runs back to England and
the sport of bull baiting." Both English and Staffordshire bull terriers were
bred to fight the bulls until Parliament outlawed the sport.' Then, in the
early 1800's, it became popular to make the dogs fight each other.10 When
Parliament also outlawed this, the sport was carried on illicitly. In the
United States, the dogs acquired the denomination of pit bull dogs because
they were trained by some owners to fight in a "pit" for gambling pur-
poses." Most so-called pit bull dogs in the United States are actually mixed
breeds. Over the years, the dogs have been interbred with the Mastiff,
Boxer, and Boarhound breeds. 2
While dogfighting is illegal in every state, there is purportedly
widespread support for the cruel sport where dogs will frequently tear each
other apart, fighting to the death. 13 Pit bulls are favored for dogfighting
7 The Act was introduced by Rep. Robert Hickey, D-39th District, of Dayton.
The attack that served as the catalyst for the introduction involved the death of
retired physician William G. Eckman. Eckman was mauled by two pit bull dogs
owned by Joetta Darmstetter, an alleged prostitute, and Wilbur Rutledge. The
couple was tried and subsequently acquitted under a city dog ordinance which did
not cover fatal attacks occurring on the dog owner's property. The question of when
the fatal portion of the attack occurred went to the jury and resulted in acquittal.
During the trial the prosecution attempted to show that Eckman was a customer
of Darmstetter and was attacked while he and Darmstetter argued about money
on the premises. The prosecution also argued that the dogs had shown vicious
tendencies beforehand and that the owners should have known. However, neither
of these arguments succeeded in persuading the jury. See Cleveland Plain Dealer,
Oct. 16, 1987, at B-3.
' Bull baiting is an old English sport, now universally prohibited, of torment-
ing bulls by setting dogs to attack them.
' See Fox, supra note 6, at 16.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 OiO REV. CODE ANN. § 959.16 (Baldwin 1980) is the pertinent statute in Ohio.
The statute reads in part:
(A) No person shall knowingly do any of the following:
(1) Promote, engage in, or be employed at dogfighting;
(2) Receive money for the admission of another person to a place
kept for dogfighting;
(3) Sell, purchase, possess, or train a dog for dogfighting;
(4) Use, train, or possess a dog for seizing, detaining, or maltreat-
ing a domestic animal;
(5) Purchase a ticket of admission to or be present at a dogfight;
(6) Witness a dogfight if it is presented as a public spectacle.
While prohibited because of its cruelty, based on the number of dog fight pros-
ecutions, dog fighting obviously enjoys considerable popularity. See Barton v. State,
253 Ga. 478, 322 S.E.2d 54 (1984) (sustaining a conviction of dogfighting and gam-
bling); Williams v. State, 462 So. 2d 771 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (interpretation of
19891
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because of their powerful jaws. 4 Once the dog has bitten down on
something, they are trained to retain their grip, making it nearly impossi-
ble to force them to let go.' 5 Pit bull dogs have also become the favored
pet of drug dealers, street gangs and others who depend on the dog's fierce
reputation to support their illicit activities. 1 Thus, association with
criminal activity has also contributed to the dog's bad reputation.
Many would argue that the reputation is ill-deserved. 7 The pit bull dog
is not the first breed to cause such a reaction. Similar public outrage was
expressed in the media in the past over German shepherds, Doberman
pinschers, Chow Chows and Rottweilers. 1 In addition, not all pit bull dogs
are vicious. Advocates of pit bull dogs claim the dogs are obedient and loyal
pets, if properly trained. Many are, in fact, friendly family pets, not killers.
They have even been used successfully to work with children in television
shows.19 Most experts consider dogs to be a product of their environment
and training.2" Pit bull dogs are the same as any other dog in the
an Alabama statute making it a crime to own, possess, keep or train a dog or dogs
with intent that such dog or dogs be engaged in an exhibition of fighting with
another dog); Hargrove v. State, 253 Ga. 450, 321 S.E.2d 104 (1984) (upholding
convictions for dogfighting and gambling, as well as finding a statute prohibiting
dogfighting to be constitutional); People v. Cyr, 113 Mich. App. 213, 317 N.W.2d
857 (1982) (conviction for conspiracy to violate dog fighting statute upheld).
11 Intent on creating the ultimate fighting animal, certain breeders have gone
further, training the dogs on treadmills to build stamina and muscle. The dogs
may be starved or fed blood to make them mean. Some trainers have been caught
stealing cats or small dogs for pit bulls to use as practice kills. See Fox, supra note
6, at 16.
'5 Pit bull dogs may be generally described as a small, powerful animal with
a muscular body. Pit bulls are distinguished by their blunt muzzles, blocky heads,
small dark triangular eyes, and a short, flat glossy coat. According to the court
in City of Lima v. McFadden, No. 1-85-22 (Ct. App. Allen County, June 30, 1986):
There are two varieties [of pit bull dogs]: white and colored ... The
Bull Terrier can be called the original egghead in the canine world.
Looking at the dog full face, the head appears long and strong and is
oval, or egg shaped. In profile, it curves gently downward from the top
of the skull to the tip of the nose. The coat is short, flat, harsh to the
touch, and has a fine gloss. The dog's skin fits very tightly. The small,
triangular eyes, as dark as possible, have a piercing glint. They are
close set and high on the dog's head.
's See Fox, supra note 6, at 16. This problem is addressed in Olno REV. CODE
ANN. § 955.11(AX5) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
V West 57th (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 9, 1988).
'" West 57th (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 9, 1988).
19 Pete, of the old "Our Gang" television show was a pit bull terrier who was
a lovable little dog. He was used successfully to work with the children on the show.
Opponents of municipal laws which ban people from keeping pit bull dogs have
emphasized this point. "In Cincinnati ... that city's law ... would not only pro-
hibit 'Spuds McKenzie' entirely, but also 'Petey', the Our Gang dog, and probably
the 'Victrola' dog." Nat'l L.J., Oct. 31, 1988, at 3, col. 1.
'0 West 57th (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 9, 1988).
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respect that if they are trained to be aggressive, they will become ag-
gressive'.
2
III. THE PRE-JULY 1987 DOG LAW m OHIO
To understand the impact of the new statute, an examination of Ohio
dog law is helpful. Prior to the enactment of the new statute, a party in-
jured by a dog could sue under either common law or the prior Ohio
statute. 2  The common law dealt primarily with injuries to persons or prop-
erty. The statute dealt with not only injuries, but also transfer of owner-
ship of dogs, justifiable dog killings, and local dog control laws, among other
things.
A. Common Law
At common law, the injured party had to allege and demonstrate the
owner's knowledge of the vicious propensities of the dog. A showing that
the dog owner knew the dog had bitten or attempted to bite previously
was generally required. This led to development of the doctrine that every
dog was entitled to one free bite before the owner could be held to
knowledge of its propensities.23 The key to common law liability was the
owner's negligent conduct in keeping the animal after obtaining knowledge
of its mischievous propensities and in failing to properly restrain the
animal to prevent future harm to anyone not a trespasser.
The one bite rule was actually a misunderstood proposition. It was true
that once a dog had bitten, the owner would have notice of its dangerous
propensities, and thus be held liable for all bites thereafter. However, the
converse of the proposition was not true. A dog that had not bitten previous-
ly could still have exhibited other evidence of its dangerous propensities
"I It is necessary at this point to insert a caveat. While it may be true that some
people have pit bull dogs as pets, it is also true that the dogs are most frequently
associated with a group of people who abuse them and train them for fighting. The
consequences of these activities are extremely serious. This Note does not support
the position that such behavior should be condoned or go unpunished. Animal
owners do not have an unfettered right to possess animals which present a danger
to others. This Note merely questions the propriety of a statute which singles out
a specific type of dog. Such narrowness in statutory drafting fails to account for
the other breeds, particularly Dobermans and German Shepherds, which have been
associated with viciousness in the past, as well as new breeds which may develop
in the future with equal or greater vicious tendencies.
11 In Lisk v. Hora, 109 Ohio St. 519, 143 N.E. 545 (1924), the court established
a right to maintain an action at common law or under the statute. This was subse-
quently reaffirmed in McIntosh v. Doddy, 81 Ohio App. 351, 77 N.E.2d 260 (1947),
where the court advanced the proposition that it was not necessary to the cause
of action to specifically plead whether the action was brought under the common
law or the statute because the facts pleaded would distinguish between the two
causes of action.
" This common law rule finds its roots in old English cases dealing with animal
attacks. See May v. Burdett, 9 Q.B. 101, 115 Eng. Rep. 1213 (1846); and Baker
v. Snell, 2 K.B. 825 (1908).
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such that the owner would be put on notice of its potential to be dangerous."
B. Under the Prior Statute
Under the prior Ohio statute, the owner or keeper of a dog was absolute-
ly liable for any damage or injuries caused by his dog.n The absolute liabili-
ty applied unless the person was injured while trespassing or teasing, abus-
ing, or tormenting the dog on the owner's property. 6 The trespassing and
teasing, abusing, or tormenting provisions represented the codification of
the concept that an owner should not be penalized for the dog's actions
when the injured party had engaged in conduct that in some manner con-
tributed to the likelihood of the attack. An action brought under the statute
abrogated the common law requirement of negligence and imposed absolute
liability for any injury. Therefore, under Ohio Revised Code section 955.28
liability was based solely on the dog's conduct." The injured party did not
need to allege or prove either knowledge on the owner's part of the vicious
nature of the dog or any associated negligence.
In interpreting the statute, courts adopted a tort causation analysis of
any injury caused by a dog. Thus, under the statute the manner in which
the injury was inflicted was immaterial, provided the dog was the prox-
imate cause of the injury. This test resulted in cases where owner liabili-
ty was predicated on the dog being the catalyst of some accident which
resulted in the ultimate injury or damage."
For instance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, §509 comment g (1976), states:
It is not necessary to the application of the rule ... that the
possessor of the domestic animal know of its abnormally dangerous pro-
pensities; it is enough that he had reason to know of them. Thus it is
not necessary that he know that it has previously attacked human be-
ings or animals or has done harm by being over-violent in play or by
digging up vegetation. A dog is not necessarily regarded as entitled
to one bite. It is enough that the possessor of the animal knows that
it has on other occasions exhibited such a tendency to attack human
beings or other animals or other wise to do harm as should apprise him
of its dangerous character ...
22 This analysis incorporates both the provisions of the old Ohio General Code,
as well as the Ohio Revised Code, as the provisions concerning dogs remained
substantially unchanged in the revision. See Omno GENERAL CODE § 5838, which
was adopted in essentially the same form in Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.28 (amended
1987).
2" Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.28 (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
27 The statute imposed an absolute liability on the owner of the dog, making
the common law requirement of averring and proving scienter unnecessary. The
dog was considered property, the conduct of which rendered the owner liable.
Kleybolte v. Buffon, 89 Ohio St. 61, 105 N.E. 192 (1913); Lisk v. Hora, 109 Ohio
St. 519, 143 N.E. 545 (1924).
28 Bailey v. Prickett, 15 Ohio L. Abs. 336 (1933) (owner of a dog was held liable
for injuries to a school boy on roller skates who was struck by a car as a result
of trying to escape a dog who was leaping at him by fleeing into the street).
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The prior law also contained specific provisions on transfer of ownership
or possession of a dog. It required the seller of a dog to give the buyer a
signed transfer of ownership certificate containing the dog's registration
number, the seller's name, and the dog's description. This transfer was
to be recorded with the appropriate county official.2 9 The failure to com-
ply with the procedure was a minor misdemeanor for the seller.
3 0
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW STATUTE
The new vicious dog statute in Ohio was designed to revise and supple-
ment the existing law. The statute reflects several significant changes from
the former law. For instance, it changes the Ohio dog law regarding the
control of dangerous, vicious, and other dogs, the power to kill certain dogs,
and related criminal penalties. 1 The statute imposes liability insurance
requirements for the owners, keepers, and harborers32 of vicious dogs. It
also amends the ownership transfer provisions to require additional in-
formation concerning the animal's behavior.22
A. Language
The act was the subject of much debate, publicity, and protest in the
legislature.' The statute underwent many changes before reaching the
form in which it was passed. The legislative hearings and resulting statute
were "based more on emotion and a sense of urgency, than on rationali-
ty." 15 Given the state of the common law and statutory law at the time
of the decision to amend, the legislature went through some interesting
convolutions to reach the desired results, and created some problematic
29 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.11 (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
20 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.99(A) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
21 The criminal penalties associated with the act were somewhat higher than
expected by some members of the legislature. Interview with Ohio State Senator
Grace Drake, R-22nd District (Dec. 29, 1987).
32 Hereinafter, the term "owner" will be used to encompass the three states
of possession of a dog: owners, keepers, and harborers.
3Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.11(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
The legislature debated the act and gave it considerably more attention than
other topics before it. The debates were very emotional and resulted in a lack of
good sense in certain parts. See infra note 36. Not only did the legislature get caught
up in the emotion, but pit bull owners and their dogs arrived to protest the legisla-
tion being considered. One particularly memorable event involved a pit bull owner
who had just finished telling observers that his dog was a friendly animal. When
a microphone was placed in front of the dog's face, it proceeded to try to take a
bite of the microphone. Interview with Ohio State Senator Grace Drake, R-22nd
District (Dec. 29, 1987).
35 Interview with Ohio State Senator Grace Drake, R-22nd District (Dec. 29,
1987).
1989]
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situations along the way."
The most significant change from the prior dog law was the inclusion
of propensity analysis. As originally introduced, the statute categorized
dogs according to their behavioral propensities."' However, the statute was
amended to designate pit bull dogs as prima facie vicious, while retaining
the propensities analysis for other types of dogs. This was an important
but troubling change.
The new statute retains the absolute liability standard found in the old
statute. It makes any owner of a dog liable for damages or any injury, death,
or loss caused to a person.38 The exception to this rule prevents an injured
party from recovering if, at the time of the injury, they were committing
or attempting to commit a trespass or other criminal offense against any
person, or were teasing, tormenting, or abusing the dog on the owner's
property."
To fulfill the notice requirements of criminal statutes, the new statute
provided several elaborate definitional provisions to identify dogs to which
the other provisions would apply. The statute defines a dangerous dog as:
A dog that, without provocation.., has chased, or approached
in either a menacing fashion or an apparent attitude of attack,
or has attempted to bite or otherwise endanger any person, while
that dog is off the premises of its owner, keeper, or harborer and
not under the reasonable control of its owner, keeper, harborer,
or some other responsible person, or not physically restrained
or confined in a locked pen which has a top, locked fenced yard,
or other locked enclosure which has a top.'"
As the proposed act originally read, a literal reading would have resulted
in the outlawing of using dogs for hunting. This would be an unusual result con-
sidering that the proposal originated in southern Ohio, an area known for hunt-
ing. Interview with Ohio State Representative William G. Batchelder III, R-4th
District (Dec. 29, 1987).
17 The statute as introduced by Representative Hickey, D-39th District, of
Dayton, contained no mention of the pit bull dog as a breed, and instead opted
for the more general language which classified dogs according to their dangerous
or vicious propensities. See supra note 4. While this language was retained in the
statute as adopted, it was also amended to include the specific reference to pit bull
dogs in OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.11(AX4XaXiii) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
"The new statute updated the language of the old law from the owner or keeper,
to the owner, keeper, or harborer language to eliminate inconsistencies within the
provisions of the Act and to more accurately reflect traditional tort liability
language. Interview with Ohio State Senator Grace Drake, R-22 District (Dec. 29,
1987). This information is also reflected in a file report prepared for the Senator
before the report of the House Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor Committee was
documented.
19 OHno REV. CODE ANN. § 955.11(AX5) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).4 0 OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.11(AX1Xa) (Baldwin Supp. 1987). The Code then
excepts from this definition of dangerous dogs, any police dog that has behaved
in a manner which would ordinarily indicate a dangerous dog while that dog was
being used in a law enforcement capacity. See Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.11(AX1Xb)
(Baldwin Supp. 1987).
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As defined by the statute, a menacing fashion means that the dog would
cause any person being chased or approached to reasonably believe that
the dog will cause physical injury to that person.4" Without provocation
means that there was no teasing, tormenting, or abuse by a person, or that
the dog was not coming to the aid or the defense of a person who was not
engaged in illegal or criminal activity and who was not using the dog as
a means of carrying out such activity. "2
The statute defines a vicious dog as a dog which:
Without provocation.., meets any of the following: (i) has killed
or caused serious injury to any person; (ii) has caused injury
other than killing or serious injury to any person, or has killed
another dog; (iii) belongs to a breed commonly known as a pit
bull dog. The ownership, keeping, or harboring of such a breed
of dog shall be prima facie evidence of the ownership, keeping,
or harboring of a vicious dog.
4
There are two exceptions to the vicious dog definition. First, there is a
"line of duty" exception for police dogs. A police dog is not a vicious dog
if the dog kills or causes injury to any person while assisting one or more
law enforcement officers in the performance of their official duties.44 Sec-
ond, a dog is not considered vicious if it kills or causes serious injury to
any person while a person is committing or attempting to commit a trespass
or other criminal offense on the property of the dog's owner.41
The statute amended the prior law concerning transfer of ownership or
possession of a dog and recodified it with additional provisions. The act
provides a specific course of action to be followed in transferring owner-
ship of any dog. The transfer of ownership requires the filing of an owner-
ship certificate. ' Prior to the transfer, at the buyer's request, a seller must
provide written notice to the new owner relative to the behavior and pro-
pensities of the dog.4" In addition, within ten days after the transfer of the
animal, if the seller has knowledge of the dog being dangerous or vicious,
he must provide a completed copy of a written form4 8 which describes the
dog's behavior to the buyer or other transferee, the board of health for the
district in which the buyer or other transferee resides, and the dog warden
41 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 955.11(AX2) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
42 Oino REV. CODE ANN. § 955.11(AX5) (Baldwin Supp. 1987). This provision
is specifically aimed at the use of pit bull dogs in illicit activities, such as nar-
cotics offenses.
430 io REV. CODE ANN. § 955.11(AX4Xa) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
" Oio REV. CODE ANN. § 955.11(AX4)(bXi) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
45 OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.11(AX4)(bXii) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
G OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 955.11(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
' OHo REV. CODE ArN. § 955.11(C) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
41 The form is available from the dog warden.
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of the county in which the buyer or transferee resides.49 The criminal penal-
ty for failure to file a certificate is a minor misdemeanor. 50 If a seller
violates the notice requirements relative to behavior and propensities or
the requisite form requirements relative to dangerous or vicious dogs, it
is a minor misdemeanor on the first offense and a misdemeanor of the
fourth degree on each subsequent offense. 1
The statute requires the owner of any dog to either keep it physically
confined or restrained on his premises by a leash, tether, adequate fence,
supervision, or secure enclosure to prevent escape, or under reasonable
control of some person.5" This does not apply to dogs lawfully engaged in
hunting.53 In addition, the statute requires the owner of a dangerous or
vicious dog, except when the dog is lawfully engaged in hunting, to con-
trol the dog both on and off the owner's premises. If the dog is on the owner's
premises, it must be securely confined at all times in a locked pen or
enclosure with a top, or in a locked fenced yard. If the dog is dangerous,
but not vicious, it can be tied with a leash or tether so long as it is ade-
quately restrained.'
If the dog is to be off the premises, it must be kept on a chain link leash
or tether of not more than six feet, and must meet at least one of the follow-
ing requirements: 1) It must be kept in a locked pen which has a top,
locked fenced yard, or other locked enclosure with a top; 2) It must be on
a leash or tether controlled by a person of suitable age and discretion, or
it must be securely attached, tied, or affixed to the ground, a stationary
object, or fixture so that the dog is adequately restrained, and the person
19 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.11(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1987). This Code section
requires the seller to furnish the following information:
(1) The name and address of the buyer or other transferee of the
dog; (2) The age, sex, color, breed, and current registration number of
the dog. In addition, the seller shall answer the following questions
which shall be specifically stated on the form as follows: "Has the dog
every chased or attempted to attack or bite a person? If yes, describe
the incident(s) in which the behavior occurred." "Has the dog ever bit-
ten a person? If yes, describe the incident(s) in which the behavior oc-
curred." "Has the dog ever seriously injured or killed a person? If yes,
describe the incident(s) in which the behavior occurred."
5 00mo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.99(AX1) (Baldwin Supp. 1987). For penalties, see
infra note 51.
51 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.99(AX2) (Baldwin Supp. 1987). Omo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2929.21 (Baldwin Supp. 1986) provides the penalties for misdemeanors,
which may involve both a fine and/or a term of imprisonment. The penalty for a
minor misdemeanor may be a fine of up to $100. A misdemeanor of the fourth degree
may result in up to a 30 day prison sentence and/or a $250 fine. A misdemeanor
of the third degree may result in up to 60 days in prison and/or a $500 fine. A
misdemeanor of the second degree may result in up to 90 days in prison and/or
a $750 fine. A misdemeanor of the first degree may result in up to 6 months in
prison and/or a $1,000 fine.
1 Oimo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.22(C) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
3 id
54 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.22(DX1) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
[Vol. 37:1
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol37/iss1/4
OHIO'S VICIOUS DOG STATUTE
must be stationed in close enough proximity to the dog so as to prevent
it from causing injury to any person; 3) The dog must be muzzled."
A failure to comply with the confinement and leash requirements may
result in a fine or imprisonment under the terms of the statute.5 6 In addi-
tion, for a violation of the confinement laws, the court may order an of-
fender to personally supervise his dog, cause him to send the dog to obe-
dience training, or both. 7 For dangerous dogs, a violation of the confine-
ment laws can result in a fourth degree misdemeanor on the first offense
and a third degree misdemeanor for each subsequent offense. 5 If necessary,
the court may also order a dangerous dog to be humanely destroyed by
a licensed veterinarian.5 9 If the violation involves a vicious dog that has
killed or caused serious injury, it is a fourth degree felony on the first of-
fense, and on any subsequent offense.0 Additionally, the court must order
the dog destroyed.6 Alternatively, the court may impose a misdemeanor
of the first degree on a first offense and a felony of the fourth degree on
each subsequent offense and may order the dog destroyed.'5 If a vicious
dog causes injury other than killing or serious injury, it is a misdemeanor
of the first degree.63
The owner of a vicious dog is required by statute to obtain liability in-
surance with an authorized insurer who can write liability insurance in
the state. The insurance coverage must be not less than $50,000 to cover
any damage, bodily injury, or death to a person caused by a vicious dog."
Failure to obtain the requisite insurance is a first degree misdemeanor. 5
B. Consequences
As a consequence of the new statute, owners of pit bull dogs, in particular,
and all dogs, in general, have found themselves in an unusual situa-
5' OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.22(DX2) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
56 Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 955.99(EX1) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
5' Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.99(EX2) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
11 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.99(F) (Baldwin Supp.1987). See supra note 51,
for accompanying penalties in Ohio.
59 Id.
60 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 955.99(GX1) (Baldwin Supp. 1987). Omo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2929.11 (Baldwin Supp. 1986) provides the penalties for felonies, which may
involve both a fine and/or a term of imprisonment. The penalty for a felony of the
fourth degree may be a fine of up to $2,500 and a maximum prison sentence of
five years. A felony of the third degree may result in a fine of up to $5,000 and
a maximum prison sentence of 10 years. A felony of the second degree may result
in a fine of up to $7,500 and a maximum prison sentence of 15 years. A felony
of the first degree may result in a fine of up to $10,000 and a maximum prison
sentence of 25 years.
61 Id.
62 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 955.99(GX2) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
63 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.99(GX3) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
" Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.22(E) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
"s OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 955.99(H) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
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tion. The pit bull dog is considered prima facie vicious, and hence owner-
ship is a violation of the statute unless the owner complies with the
statutory obligations, particularly the liability insurance requirement. Not
wishing to subject themselves to the criminal penalties which accompany
the law, owners who seek to obtain the required insurance find that in-
surance companies are reluctant to provide them with the insurance
because the dogs are considered uninsurable risks. 6 In addition, no dog
owner is safe if his dog resembles the concept of what a pit bull looks like
in the minds of law enforcement officers, judges, or juries. Regardless of
whether the dog is a pit bull, if it is found to be vicious by the authorities,
the owner can be subject to criminal penalties.
As an unexpected and unfortunate result of the statute, many pit bull
dog owners are voluntarily turning in their dogs to enforcement authorities,
rather than complying with the terms of the statute. 7 Owners consider
the burden of the legal, financial, and moral obligations too great if their
dog should get loose and injure someone, fatally or otherwise. Most dogs
turned in are considered unadoptable, and are subsequently destroyed. The
other alternative to turning the dog in, for which many owners have opted,
is simply to set it free. Such a release causes its own set of problems. The
owner is still liable for the dog's actions, if the owner can be identified.
Such animals running wild pose an even greater threat to safety than those
that are owned as pets. The loose dogs suffer from hunger and disease and
are more prone to attack than those kept as pets.
The specification of the pit bull dog on the face of the statute has also
led law enforcement officials to take actions that owners resent. Special
letters informing the owners of pit bull dogs of the new statute and its
requirements sent to those owners who were identified by using county
dog registration records prompted outrage and accusations that the en-
"Both Ohio State Senator Grace Drake and Ohio State Representative William
G. Batchelder III commented on the fact that no insurance company is willing to
take on the dogs as they are an uninsurable risk. Senator Drake suggested that
if the legislature felt that it was necessary to institute an insurance requirement,
then there should be some sort of provision designating the company or companies
who must write the policies. Interviews with Ohio State Senator Grace Drake,
R-22nd District (Dec. 29, 1987) and Ohio State Representative William G.
Batchelder, III R4th District (Dec. 29, 1987).
" In counties throughout Ohio, owners have voluntarily turned in their pit bull
dogs, or similar breeds, to be destroyed. In Summit County, the number of dogs
turned in the first half of 1987 went from five to 12 and then after the statute took
effect in July, the number more than doubled again. In Montgomery County, owners
have turned over more than 12 pit bulls, or similar dogs, each month since June
1987. Similar results have followed in other counties. Akron Beacon Journal, Oct.
1, 1987, at 1. These voluntary turn ins are in addition to the number of animals
impounded under the statute. In Summit County, 62 pit bull dogs were impounded
between the beginning of 1987 and October 1, 1987. The complaint in Ohio Dog
Breeders Ass'n v. Celeste, No. C87-2708Y (N.D. Ohio Oct. 14, 1987) alleged that
as of the time of filing, 63 dog owners had siurendered their dogs to the county
dog warden for destruction.
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forcement officials were engaging in a vendetta to eliminate pit bull dogs
entirely.68
V. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATUTE
The statute poses difficult problems from a constitutional standpoint.
Criticism of the statute followed immediately upon its passage. 9 The
statute has been challenged on several fronts as being unconstitutional.
These challenges include vagueness, denial of equal protection and denial
of due process.
Specifically, dog breeders and pit bull owners claim that the statute
singles out pit bull owners without defining what a pit bull dog is, thus
allowing wide discretion in determining which dogs fall into the classifica-
tion. 0 Owners allege that by making the pit bull dog prima facie vicious,
the statute has in effect prohibited their ownership within the state, and
licensed the courts to mandate their destruction.71 The liability insurance
618 Attached to the complaint in Ohio Dog Breeders Ass'n v. Celeste, No.
C87-2708Y (N.D. Ohio Oct. 14, 1987) was a copy of a letter addressed to pit bull
terrier owners in Mahoning County by the Mahoning County Dog Warden inform-
ing the owners of the new law and its terms. The letter was addressed solely to
pit bull terrier owners. The Ohio Dog Breeders Association claims this is further
evidence of the discriminatory enforcement intent against pit bull owners only.
69 Interview with Ohio State Representative William G. Batchelder III, R-4th
District (December 29, 1987).0 This is not a novel claim with respect to statutes that are breed specific. Prior
to the passage of Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.11, many municipal statutes both
in Ohio and nationwide sought to control the ownership of pit bull dogs by specifical-
ly mentioning them in some capacity and similar outrages resulted. Several
municipal statutes have been the subject of litigation on constitutional grounds.
See Holt v. City of Maumelle, 647 F. Supp. 1529 (E.D. Ark. 1986); Starkey v.
Township of Chester, 628 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Pa. 1986); City of Lima v. McFadden,
No. 1-85-22 (Ct. App. Allen County, June 30, 1986).
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.01 (Baldwin 1985) governs registration of dogs in
Ohio. The statute requires the registration every year by every person who owns,
keeps, or harbors a dog more than three months of age. The application must state
the following: "age, sex, color, character of hair, whether short or long, breed if
known, and the name and address of the owner of the dog."
The nature of the statute poses a unique problem in that it encourages evasion
of enforcement. To a certain degree, the statute is self-enforcing because it requires
the dog owner to register the breed of animal, if known, pursuant to Omo REV.
CODE ANN. § 955.01 (Baldwin Supp. 1987). Thus, it is left to the owner to either
truthfully identify their dog as a pit bull dog or to allege that the dog is a mixed
breed. Enforcement officials can therefore place little faith in information provided
in registration forms. In fact, the use of dog registration records to identify poten-
tial pit bull dog owners creates an ironic situation. The statute may do more to
encourage owners to falsify the registration forms and claim that they own a mixed
breed dog of unknown lineage, rather than truthfully claim the dog as a pit bull
and be an identifiable subject of the statute.
" Such prima facie crimes are always somewhat troublesome, both constitu-
tionally and philosophically. The presumption that mere possession of such an
animal makes it prima facie vicious and that its ownership carries additional
19891
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requirement is also challenged as imposing an unfair burden on the owners
of pit bull dogs.7 2 It can be asserted that the state has overstepped its bounds
in regulating the dogs to the point where the state is in effect taking the
dogs without due process of law or just compensation for their value to
the owners. For these reasons, among others, the statute has been attacked
as unconstitutionally vague and for violating both the equal protection
and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
Challengers to the statute face a difficult battle since a legislative act
is generally entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality.73 Fur-
ther, clear and convincing evidence to the contrary must be presented if
the statute is to be successfully challenged.
74
A. Vagueness Challenge
The main challenge to the constitutionality of the statute is that the use
of the term "pit bull dog" is definitionally vague. The act defined a pit
bull dog as prima facie vicious without providing a definition as to what
a pit bull dog is or subjecting it to the propensities analysis to which other
dogs are subject, thereby making a blanket assumption about the nature
of that type of dog.7
5
It is a fundamental requirement of criminal statutes that they inform
the citizens with reasonable precision what acts are prohibited so the
citizens may have a certain, understandable standard of conduct to which
to conform.7" The standard for determining whether a statute should be
declared void for vagueness may also be stated as follows: The statute may
not be so vague that "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
burdens raises immediate constitutional concerns for the rights of those who exer-
cise their free will in owning such animals, and philosophical concerns as to whether
it is just to isolate the single breed and attach a stigma to it.
72 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.22(E) (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
7 State v. DePascale, 11 Ohio App. 3d 163, 463 N.E.2d 1284 (1983) (recited
the general principles which govern a constitutional challenge to a statute in a
challenge to Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.21 which requires the application for
registration and the payment of associated fees that the court upheld as not un-
constitutionally discriminatory).
74 lL
11 The fact that there was no attempt to define what a pit bull dog is or to give
any identifying characteristics is highly inconsistent given the meticulous defini-
tions provided in the same section of the statute for the purposes of identifying
dangerous or vicious dogs. See Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.11(A) (Baldwin Supp.
1987).
7' See also U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) (person cannot reasonably be
held criminally responsible for conduct not reasonably understood to be proscribed);
Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971) (where the court reversed judgment
against Palmer for violation of a 'suspicious person' ordinance because the ordinance
was so vague and lacking in ascertainable standards of guilt that it failed to give
a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is for-
bidden); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (held city ordinance requiring
three or more people who meet together on a street corner or sidewalk to conduct
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at its meaning and differ as to its application.""'
A criminal statute must meet two requirements of clarity or it may be
struck down as overly vague. First, it must place persons on notice as to
what activity is made criminal to prevent a deterrent effect on the exer-
cise of constitutional rights which could result if the statute's application
was unclear.7 8 Second, and more important, for a statute not to be con-
sidered vague, it must provide clear guidelines of offending conduct to
govern law enforcement.7 9 Without such guidelines, law enforcement of-
ficers, judges, and juries would have discretion to enforce statutes on an
arbitrary basis.80 However, a statute need not define its own terms with
extreme particularity." The law in Ohio merely requires that criminal
statutes must be so explicit and clear that all persons of ordinary in-
telligence who are subject to their penalties will understand their provi-
sions.2
Since "the degree of constitutionally tolerable vagueness is not calculable
with precision," 83 the legislature was confronted with the dilemma of
whether to draft a statute narrowly and risk its ineffectiveness by eva-
sion through the use of technical loopholes or to draft it with great generali-
ty and risk trapping more "innocents in a net designed for others. ' ' " The
question ultimately arises whether the term "pit bull dog" is a term suscep-
tible to definition by reference to reasonable and readily accessible source
material. When engaging in such interpretation, courts can, and frequently
do, rely on common law devices to save statutory terms from vagueness.
There is disagreement about what a pit bull dog is and whether it is ac-
tually a breed. Certain courts have defined a pit bull dog by using a
themselves so as not to annoy a police officer or other passerby unconstitutionally
vague because the standard was unascertainable).
7 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
8 Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 438 (1959).
7 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.9 (1986)
[hereinafter CONSTrruTIONAL LAW].
80 United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
", For one thing, there are inherent limitations in the use of language; few words
possess the precision of mathematical symbols. Secondly, legislators cannot foresee
all the variations of fact situations which may arise under a statute." W. LAFAVE
& A. Scor, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 2.3(a) (1986) [hereinafter CRIMINAL LAW].
City of Lima v. McFadden, No. 1-85-22, (Ct. App. Allen County, June 30, 1986).
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 718 (1978).
84 Id,
11 United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948) (although criminal statutes
must be so unambiguous that an ordinary person may avoid unlawful conduct,
such statutes must be given their fair meaning in accord with evident intent of
legislators when interpreted).
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convoluted dictionary approach to establish a definition.6 Other sources
claim the pit bull dog is not a recognized breed.17 Certainly, if the term
is susceptible to definition, the statute cannot be struck down on the
grounds of vagueness and the constitutional attack must run to other
fronts. The argument can also be validly asserted that since the statute
applies to pit bull dog owners, it could reasonably be expected that the
owner knows what kind of dog he possesses.88 Consequently, the persons
subject to the penalties of the statute certainly find the use of the term
pit bull dog explicit enough to understand to whom the statute is directed.
Even if the statute were self-identifying as to owners, a problem exists
with the definition for law enforcement purposes.8 9
The risk of abuse in the administration of the law is present
in two forms when the meaning of a criminal statute is unclear.
One risk is that the law may be arbitrarily applied by police
and prosecution officials.... The other risk is that the law may
be so unclear that a trial court cannot properly instruct the
jury.9
88In McFadden, the court defined a pit bull dog by looking to WEBSTER'S THImD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (ed. 1981), where the term "pit bull" or "pit bull
terrier" referred the reader to "bullterrier." Bullterrier was defined as:
a short-haired terrier of a breed originating in England by crossing the
bulldog with terriers to develop a dog of speed, hardihood and power-
ful bite for use in dog fights, dogs of breed having great courage and
strength but being built on the trim lines of a terrier.
Id at 295. Using the bull terrier as a basis, the court then turned to two dif-
ferent books on dogs, and determined what the pit bull dog looked like by refer-
ring to photographs and descriptions of what a bull terrier should look like. On
this basis, the court concluded that the term pit bull dog was susceptible to defini-
tion and therefore was not void for vagueness.
87 THE NEW DOG ENCYCLOPEDIA 631 (1970) contains the specific warning in its
description of bull terrier: "Bull terrier should not be confused with what is popular-
ly called the American Bull Terrier or Pit Bull which was the dog sometimes used
for fighting in this country. These dogs had a shorter, squarer head with more stop
and were of a mixed type."
88 If this is so, the question then arises whether the legislature can rightfully
delegate authority for identifying pit bull dogs to the owners and make them respon-
sible for taking actions to protect themselves. This type of self-enforcing statute
also poses the additional danger of evasion through deliberately mis-stating the
breed of dog on registration materials. See supra note 70. While self-enforcing
statutes are well known to American citizens (the most common being the federal
income tax statutes and their corresponding requirement of filing an income tax
return), it is questionable whether a statute which relies in part on the willingness
of citizens to comply is an appropriate measure in an area which poses serious threat
to the well being of others.
89 It must be noted that a statute is not tested for vagueness by the terms on
its face, but rather "as it has been authoritatively construed by state courts." See
supra note 81. This "judicial gloss" will be the ultimate arbiter of whether the
term pit bull dog is susceptible to definition and hence, the statute not vague. Even
with judicial interpretation, however, it is difficult to imagine a workable stand-
ard which would provide sufficient guidance for all involved.
90 See supra note 81.
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If an owner knows what kind of dog he has, this does not mean that a
dog warden, enforcement officer, judge, or jury can reasonably be expected
to recognize a dog as a member of a specific breed. Therefore, no dog owner
can be reasonably secure in the knowledge that his dog is safe from the
application of the statute by enforcement officers. If the statute does not
clearly define what is meant by a pit bull dog, it "may trap the innocent
by not providing fair warning"91 and may, in practical effect, impermissibly
delegate "basic policy matters to policeman, judges, and juries for resolu-
tion on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with attendant dangers of arbitrary
and discriminatory application."9
To summarize the vagueness argument, by using the term "pit bull dog"
in the statute, the legislature denies the owners of pit bull dogs and dogs
which may be considered pit bulls equal protection and due process of law
by the vagueness of the term. Indeed, the arguments for equal protection
and due process run further than the vagueness of the statute's terms.
B. Equal Protection Challenge
The equal protection claims suggest that the statute discriminates
against pit bull dog owners and denies them equal protection of the laws
by exempting certain other classifications."3 "The guarantee of equal pro-
tection means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same
protection of the law which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes
in the same place and under similar circumstances."" "All laws however
" Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1977).
92 Id
9 Assuming that the term pit bull dog is susceptible to definition and not void
for vagueness, opponents of the statute claim that the exception of police dogs that
would be vicious but for the fact that the offending behavior occurred in the line
of their law enforcement activities, dogs that have created injury to various per-
sons who are engaging in criminal activities on the owners property, and hunting
dogs that are otherwise vicious is an equal protection violation. Complaint in Ohio
Dog Breeders Ass'n v. Celeste, No. C87-2708Y (N.D. Ohio, Oct. 14, 1987).
The claims do not suggest that the dogs themselves are being denied equal pro-
tection. One must be careful to distinguish between the allegation of denial of equal
protection to the dogs and the denial of equal protection to the owners of the dogs.
The former is deemed a frivolous claim, while the latter may be colorable. See Bogan
v. New London Hous. Auth., 366 F. Supp. 861 (D.C. Conn. 1973). In Bogan, the
residents of a federally assisted low income housing project claimed, among other
things, that the housing authority violated the equal protection clause by permit-
ting tenants to keep cats but not dogs. In response to this claim, the court stated:
Insofar as this claim suggests that dogs have equal protection rights,
it is plainly frivolous. Insofar as this claim asserts that defendant's pro-
hibition of dogs but not cats is unreasonable, it is subsumed under plain-
tiffs more general claim that defendants had no just cause to evict
tenants for owning a dog.
Id at 866.
" State v. DePascale, 11 Ohio App. 3d 163, 163,463 N.E.2d 1284, 1285 (1983).
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do not have to apply to all citizens in exactly the same manner and there
may be lawful classifications based upon reasonable grounds for such vary-
ing classifications."95 This is generally determined by application of the
rational basis test.
Under the rational basis test, to withstand equal protection review, the
law must be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.96 The
legislature has a reasonable degree of discretion in developing laws which
apply to some persons differently than others. 7 However, such laws must
be based on fundamentally reasonable classifications and must have the
capability of being applied reasonably and fairly among all to whom they
pertain.98 In general, courts have been "quite permissive in allowing state
legislatures to draw whatever classifications they choose in enacting
criminal laws." 99 The state must also have a legitimate interest which it
is furthering by enacting the statute.100
It can be claimed that the statute is facially discriminatory on two
grounds. First, it applies immediately only to pit bull dogs, while other
breeds of dog are examined by their propensities prior to being labelled
"dangerous" or "vicious." Second, it exempts other dogs entirely from the
statute's requirements thereby not including all who are similarly situated
with respect to the intent of the law.
The equal protection claims further suggest that the statute constitutes
unconstitutional discrimination because it hampers persons desiring to own
pit bull dogs from achieving their objective, when no such obstacle to owner-
ship faces those who wish to own other types of dogs. The liability insurance
requirement can also be challenged as an unconstitutional penalty imposed
on persons who exercise free choice to own a particular breed of dog.
Under the traditional rational basis analysis,' the judiciary is reluc-
tant to interfere in social and economic regulations and therefore defers
to the judgment of the legislature concerning the necessity and
reasonableness of the statute.10 The courts have determined that the state,
11 Id at 163, 463 N.E.2d at 1285.
" There are various articulations of the rational basis standard. Generally, the
equal protection clause is satisfied if the statutory classification is "rationally
related to a legitimate state interest." New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303
(1976). At times, the court has adopted a more restrictive approach to equal pro-
tection, stating the test as: "The classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary,
and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial rela-
tion to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike." F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,415 (1920).
9' See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
98 See State v. DePascale, 11 Ohio App. 3d 163, 463 N.E.2d 1284 (1983).
CImwNAL LAW, supra note 81, § 2.11(b) at 144.
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); New
York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
... See supra note 96.
" See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980). In Fritz,
the court stated: "[Tihe court in cases involving social and economic benefits has
consistently refused to invalidate on equal protection grounds legislation which
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rather than federal, level is appropriate for such decisions concerning social
and economic regulation. Therefore, given the testimony and exhibitions
on the floor of the House concerning pit bulls, the legislature could
reasonably determine that pit bull dogs are in fact vicious enough to war-
rant special treatment.' 3 On this analysis, the statute reflects reasonable
classifications to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of
Ohio.
The protection of the health and safety of its citizens is recognized as
a legitimate state interest. The use of pit bulls in dog fighting, gambling,
and other criminal activity poses a valid threat to health and safety, par-
ticularly when the dogs are trained to be aggressive. However, it can be
argued that the means chosen to protect that end are not adequately related
to those goals. By singling out pit bull dogs, the legislature in effect ig-
nores the fact that other breeds are also to blame for injury and leaves
those potentially vicious animals untouched. In fact, many dangerous dogs
are not registered under any specific breed and a breed specific statute
would not reach them.
A state is also justified in legislating on a step by step basis to conquer
a problem it considers a threat to health or safety of state residents.1" As
the legislature could reasonably have inferred that pit bull dogs were
responsible for a majority of dog attacks based on the testimony before
them, they could justifiably make pit bull dogs their first step in controll-
ing the problem.
It is the state legislatures which are best able to decide whether a par-
ticular situation poses a threat to the health, safety, or welfare of its
citizens. If they find it necessary to enact legislation, the courts will step
it simply deemed unwise or unartfully drawn. ... [T]he plain language of [the
statute] marks the beginning and end of our inquiry." I& at 167, 176. Accord Kadr-
mas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988), where the court stated that
social and economic legislation bear a presumption of constitutionality that can
only be overcome by a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality. Id at 2489.
Likewise, in the context of vicious dog legislation, see Holt v. City of Maumelle,
647 F. Supp. 1529 (E.D. Ark. 1986), where the court abstained from judgment and
dismissed without prejudice until questions of state law could be resolved, but did
comment on the distinctly local nature of the ordinance which prohibited the keep-
ing of dogs which "substantially conformed to the standards of the American Ken-
nel Club for American Staffordshire Terrier or Staffordshire Bull Terrier or the
United Kennel Club for American Pit Bull Terrier" and expressed a desire to avoid
needless conflict with legitimate social interests being expressed by municipalities
through legislation.
103 See supra note 34.
'o The method of approaching a problem step by step in the equal protection
analysis was approved by the Court in Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336
U.S. 106 (1949), where the court stated "lI]t is no requirement of equal protection
that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all." Id at 110. Likewise,
in Starkey v. Chester, 628 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Pa. 1986), the court stated: "The
township does not have to regulate every dangerous animal at the same time in
the same way to pass constitutional muster." Id. at 197.
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in if the statute clearly reflects no possibility of being rationally related
to those legitimate goals. Consequently, while dog owners may consider
the statute questionable, the overwhelming concern for protecting the
citizens of the state allows the legislature to take control of the situation
on a step by step basis to eliminate the problem of dog attacks, and if the
legislature chooses to begin with pit bull dogs, then it may do So.10
5
The liability insurance requirement for pit bull owners has also been
challenged as discriminatory." 6 If the designation of the pit bull dog as
vicious can withstand equal protection scrutiny, then the liability insurance
is also likely to withstand challenge. The best way to understand the in-
surance requirement is to analogize it to other types of insurance which
are risk dependent. Risk dependent insurance examines the amount of risk
associated with the particular individual or property they wish to insure.
For instance, in the same way that the twenty-two year old male owner
of an expensive sports car can expect to pay more for auto insurance than
the married fifty-five year old owner of a compact family car because they
are at different risk levels, the owner of a dog, which the legislature has
reason to believe is considerably more dangerous than many other types
of dogs, can expect to pay a premium for owning that type of dog.
The greatest criticism of the liability requirement is that the insurance
is largely unavailable to those who seek to attain it.' By an act of the
legislature, the insurance companies were given the power to determine
the fate of pit bull owners in the state. The pit bull dogs are considered
a poor insurance risk, and consequently the insurance companies will not
write policies on them at all. Thus, the fate of some pit bulls rests not in
the hands of law enforcement officials, but in insurance companies who
can deprive the owner of the protection of the law merely by refusing to
insure, even though the owners have attempted compliance.108
C. Due Process Challenge
Allegations have arisen that the statute deprives citizens of their due
process rights by depriving them of their property. Owners complain that
105 Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
106 See complaint in Ohio Dog Breeders Ass'n v. Celeste, No. C87-2798Y (N.D.
Ohio Oct. 14, 1987). Claims associated with liability insurance also arose in the
context of a similar county ordinance in Florida. In Responsible Dog Owners of
Florida, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, No. 85-6743 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 1985),
the plaintiffs challenged an ordinance purporting to regulate "Pit bulls," "American
Staffordshire Terriers" and "Staffordshire Bull Terriers." The ordinance required
every owner of a pit bull to maintain liability insurance. The federal court abstained
from deciding the merits of the claim and instructed the plaintiffs to litigate any
claims fully in state court before approaching the federal courts again.
"I See supra note 66.
'I1n Ohio, the liability insurance provision has also been challenged as an un-
constitutional delegation of authority to insurance companies under the Ohio Con-
stitution, Art. 1I, Sec. 1 and Art. I, Sec. 16. See complaint in Ohio Dog Breeders
Ass'n v. Celeste, No. C87-2708Y (N.D. Ohio Oct. 14, 1987).
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the statute has granted enforcement officials the power to identify and take
their dogs if they do not meet the requirements of the statute. Owners claim
that the dogs are personal property that the state has recognized through
its prior and continued regulation, and that the statute has suddenly denied
that right to those who possess pit bull dogs.10 9 In addition, the regulation
of pit bull dogs has given rise to the claim that the state has exceeded its
police power' to control dangerous conditions and has, in fact, initiated
a statute which constitutes a taking of the dogs without compensation to
the owners.'
The Due Process clause of the fourteenth amendment denies the states
the power to deprive any person of certain substantive rights-life, liber-
ty, and property-except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures.
Due process is a constitutional guarantee which the legislature may not
circumvent. Once the legislature elects to confer a property right, it may
not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest without
appropriate procedural safeguards. 12
Pit bull owners allege that the statute is arbitrary, unreasonable, op-
pressive, and confiscatory for two reasons. First, it permits the seizure and
destruction of any dog without compensation, either before or after the
seizure, and second, it delegates some of the power to determine the fate
of the pit bull dogs to insurance companies who ultimately decide whether
they will insure the dog or deny that insurance thus putting the owner
in violation of the statute. " '
The terms of the statute effectively give pit bull owners an ultimatum.
They must either comply with the terms of the statute or face the sanc-
109 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (where the court stated
that property interests are not created by the constitution, but are created and
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law). See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532
(1985) (where the court emphasized that a property interest is created by state law,
but once it is created, the procedures governing deprivation are a matter of federal
law).
110 Dogs are subject to the full force of police power and may be regulated in
whatever manner the legislature deems reasonable for the protection of citizens.
Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 166 U.S. 698 (1897).
"I While the principles of "taking" versus regulation are generally applied to
real property, they can just as readily be applied to personal property. In Agins
v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), the court concluded that for a land use regulation
to avoid being considered a compensable taking it must meet two requirements.
First, it must advance legitimate state interests, and second, it must not deny an
owner economically viable use of his land. This principle can be applied equally
well to the pit bull dog situation. While the same state interests that apply to equal
protection analysis (health and safety) are also applicable here, the owners of pit
bull dogs have effectively been denied the possession of their animals (some of which
can be quite costly to purchase) by their designation as prima facie vicious and
the failure of insurance companies to provide the requisite insurance.
112 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
I" Complaint in Ohio Dog Breeders Ass'n v. Celeste, No. C87-2708Y (N.D. Ohio
Oct. 14, 1987).
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tions which the statute imposes. If the owner cannot comply with the in-
surance requirement or any other provision of the statute, he can either
turn the dog over to the appropriate officials for destruction, or risk the
penalties of the statute. The actions of officials in demanding the surrender
of dogs may be a deprivation of the ajudicative process for the owners of
pit bull dogs. This is highlighted by the fact that while the statute affords
the opportunity for a determination by a judge or jury of whether their
dog can be reasonably classified as dangerous or vicious, pit bull owners
are not afforded this option. It appears that pit bull dog owners suffer a
serious deprivation of procedural due process by this denial.
The taking issue presents a unique problem. 14 It is within a state's police
power to regulate situations which it considers a threat to public health
or safety, yet "a regulation may be so restrictive as to warrant a finding
that a taking has occurred."11 5 If a taking has occurred, the owners must
receive compensation for the harm they have suffered.' Four factors are
normally determinative in deciding whether compensation is due to the
owner:
1. Whether or not the public, government or one of its agents
have physically used or occupied something belonging to the
claimant.
2. The size of the harm sustained by the claimant or the
degree to which his affected property has been devalued.
3. Whether the claimant's loss is or is not outweighed by the
public's commitant gain.
4. Whether the claimant has sustained any loss apart from
restriction of his liberty to conduct some activity considered
harmful to other people.
1 7
Given these factors, a valid argument may be made that no compensa-
tion is due the pit bull dog owners for the taking of their dogs because
114 This problem was recognized in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922), where the court stated: "The general rule is that while property may
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as
a taking." Id at 415. The court also cautioned that "a strong public desire to im-
prove the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter
cut than the constitutional way of paying for change." Id at 416. However, the
key to claims, for a taking under the fifth or fourteenth amendments is "that it
is wanted for a public use." Id at 415.
115 CONsTrruTioNAL LAW, supra note 79, § 11.12(e), at 413.
116 There are various formulations of what constitutes just compensation. The
most frequently quoted standard is attributed to Justice Holmes: "What has the
owner lost, not what has the taker gained." Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston,
217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910). This is generally referred to as the market value test.
CONSTrMTrMONAL LAW, supra note 79, § 11.14 at 417.
.. CONsTrrUTiONAL LAW, supra note 79, § 11.12(e), at 413-14.
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any harm that the owners may suffer is outweighed by gains in public safe-
ty."8 Nonetheless, these owners have been deprived of property by a law
which offered them few alternatives except to surrender their dogs for
destruction.
D. Constitutional Conclusions
If the fate of constitutional challenges to similar statutes is any indica-
tion of the outcome of this challenge, then the courts will likely uphold
this statute. Similar municipal statutes in state and federal courts have
been upheld or the court has abstained from reaching a decision."'
Municipal statutes which designated pit bull dogs as dangerous or vicious
have been interpreted to withstand the many constitutional challenges in
a variety of ways.
The vagueness argument has been rejected by using definitional
manipulations to reach an explanation of what a pit bull dog is, or by simply
saying that the owner of a pit bull should know what type of dog he owns. 2 '
I8 See Redford v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 691 F.2d 471 (10th Cir. 1982)
(the court denied compensation to the plaintiff whose firearms had been seized and
declared forfeited pursuant to a statute which prohibited any person who had been
adjudged mentally incompetent from possessing firearms); Quilici v. Village of Mor-
ton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Ill. 1981), affd 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983) (the court found that an ordinance banning posses-
sion of handguns was not a compensable taking because a gun owner was only
limited within the village but could sell or otherwise dispose of the handguns out-
side of the village and in addition, could store handguns at licensed gun clubs).
These cases can be distinguished from Ohio's vicious dog law on two grounds. First,
the pit bull dogs are taken under the statute with no prior adjudication of their
viciousness, unlike the guns in Redford that were taken only after the possessor
had been adjudicated mentally incompetent. Second, the pit bull dogs have been
effectively banned in the entire state of Ohio. Therefore, an owner must travel
out of state before he may find a willing buyer for his dog if he does not wish to
submit to the terms of the statute. Unlike a gun owner in Quilici, an owner of
a pit bull dog has no means of selling or otherwise disposing of his dog within a
reasonable distance of his home.
"I See Holt v. City of Maumelle, 647 F. Supp. 1529 (E.D. Ark. 1986) (the court
abstained from ruling on an ordinance prohibiting ownership of certain dogs
substantially conforming to the standards of the American Staffordshire Terrier
or Staffordshire Bull Terrier or the American Pit Bull Terrier until questions of
state law could be resolved, but the challenge involved questions of vagueness and
equal protection); Starkey v. Township of Chester, 628 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Pa. 1986)
(the court held that a township ordinance requiring pit bull owners to meet various
standards for ownership was not facially discriminatory and the township could
reasonably determine that pit bull dogs are dangerous); City of Lima v. McFad-
den, No. 1-85-22 (Ct. App. Allen County June 30, 1986) (the court upheld a municipal
ordinance prohibiting the keeping or ownership of more than one pit bull dog per
residence despite a challenge on the grounds that the use of the term pit bull dog
was impermissibly vague).
... McFadden, No. 1-85-22. For a description of these manipulations, see supra
note 86.
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Given the dispute over whether the pit bull dogs are an identifiable breed
and the convoluted approach to defining them that many courts have us-
ed, there appears to be a valid approach to a constitutional attack.121 In
fact, the legislature appears to be caught in a dilemma of its own making.
While the statute is narrowly drafted to encompass the breed that is
suspected of many attacks, the potential for evasion takes the form of not
only the other breeds that are excluded, but also in actions to disguise the
ownership of pit bull dogs, e.g., falsifying registration forms.
In addition, given the definitional deficiencies of the term pit bull dog,'22
this narrowly drafted provision risks the entrapment of innocents "in a
net designed for others." '23 In this instance, the dilemma appears to be
that a narrowly drafted provision risked the possibility of both evasion
and of trapping innocents, while a more general provision did not solve
the problem of identifying those dogs considered to be the major cause of
attacks prior to the first exhibition of their propensities. In choosing the
narrowly drafted provision, the legislature responded to the urgency sur-
rounding pit bull dogs and provided an immediate "fix" for the problem.
In the long run, however, such specificity in the statute does not address
the entire problem, but only a small part of it.
The discrimination argument has been dismissed by the courts as a mat-
ter which is of great local concern for the health and safety of the citizens.
The courts will not intervene or disrupt the autonomy of the municipalities
to engage in the administration of their own affairs.1 2 4 The probable con-
clusion to a court challenge on equal protection grounds can best be
summed up by the following language:
For a state is not constrained in the exercise of its police power
to ignore experience which marks a class of offenders or a fami-
ly of offenses for special treatment. Nor is it prevented by the
equal protection clause from continuing 'its restrictions to those
classes of cases where the need is deemed to be clearest.
125
'21 The federal courts have concluded that municipal statutes which mention
pit bull dogs on their face are constitutionally permissible. These statutes can be
distinguished from the Ohio statute by virtue of the inclusion of an additional
description of what constitutes a pit bull dog under the statute's terms. In Holt
v. City of Maumelle, 647 F. Supp. 1529 (E.D. Ark. 1986), the statute involved pur-
ported to prohibit "keeping of dogs substantially conforming to the standards of
the American Kennel Club for American Staffordshire Terrier or Staffordshire Bull
Terrier or the United Kennel Club for American Pit Bull Terrier ..." Id. at 1530.
In Starkey v. Township of Chester, 628 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Pa. 1986), the statute
involved purported to regulate pit bull dogs which were defined according to
American Kennel terminology and sought to reach dogs "bred for fighting." Id.
at 197.
122 L. TRIBE, supra note 83, at 718.
123 See id
u Holt v. City of Maumelle, 647 F. Supp. 1529 (E.D. Ark. 1986).
125 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 540 (1942).
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The due process claims also have some merit. A valid argument can be
made that the state has exercised its police powers such that the pit bull
dog has been regulated right out of the owner's possession. While this is
not done explicitly, it is the result of the combined impact of the statutory
requirements and the unavailability of the requisite insurance. Conse-
quently, the state government should take responsibility for the loss to
the dog owners who have turned their dogs in or had them taken under
the statute.
The likely outcome in further challenges is difficult to predict, particular-
ly given the controversy, definitional problems, and difficulties getting in-
surance that surround statutes such as this. Given the courts lack of recep-
tiveness to constitutional challenges in similar cases, a constitutional at-
tack will probably fail. However, a declaration of constitutionality does
not make the statute any less problematic. By opting for specificity on the
face of the statute, the legislature invited citizens to engage in
"creative evasion." The self-enforcing aspect of the statute which depends
on registration forms to identify pit bull dog owners delegates the ultimate
enforcement authority to the dog owner himself. In an area which the
legislature considered important enough to enact emergency legislation,
the ultimate decision as to whether a dog is dangerous or vicious should
rest in the hands of a judge, jury, or administrative body. Any dog that
is dangerous or vicious poses an immediate threat to the health and safe-
ty of the citizenry. A self-enforcing statue is not the most efficient or effec-
tive way to address the physical and emotional damage a dog attack could
create.'26
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO THE EXISTING STATUTE
Due to the potential ineffectiveness of Ohio Revised Code section 955.11,
the initiation of a new statutory format to resolve more of the problems
of dog control is in order. Primarily, vicious animal ordinances should aim
at controlling dogs through leash laws, stricter penalties for loose dogs,
and other violations of the statute, and improved enforcement laws. For
pit bull dogs, the answer does not lie in banning their ownership, whether
such a ban is constitutional or not, but in reaching the true cause of the
problem.'27 A statute which is more inclusive could conceivably achieve
126 This should be contrasted with federal and state income tax codes which
require citizen cooperation in preparing and submitting tax returns. Although,
these laws are self-enforcing, the potential evasion does not pose a threat of physical
harm to society.
12 OHIO Rnv. CODE ANN. § 955.221(D) (Baldwin Supp. 1987) permits municipal
corporations to "adopt and enforce ordinances to control dogs within the municipal
corporation that are not otherwise in conflict with any other provision of the revised
code." Perhaps the simplest way for the state to resolve its problems would have
been to simply draft a broad statute to resolve major problems that it perceived
and leave it to the municipalities to draft dog control statutes as they deemed
necessary. In this way, the state could avoid the necessity of designating a specific
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the desired results while avoiding the accompanying controversy. In ad-
dition, such a statute, which would concedely be a less offensive alternative
to dog owners, would be a much greater asset from a cooperation and en-
forcement standpoint, particularly if the legislature sought to control the
problem largely by voluntary acquiescence to the statute.
The first change in the formulation of a new statute would therefore be
to eliminate the designation of a specific breed. The revised statute would
instead rely on the propensities of the individual dog in determining
whether it is dangerous or vicious. " In general, no dog is inherently
dangerous or vicious but has merely become that way as a result of human
manipulation. To designate a specific breed in a statute implies that breed
is more dangerous or vicious than another breed. This implication may
serve to discourage the ownership of a designated breed, but it can also
foreseeably lead to the development of a different type of dog with equally
dangerous or vicious tendencies which is not subject to the statutory
penalties.
A statutory format which relies solely on classification of dogs by pro-
pensity for the purpose of imposing criminal liability on its owner is a more
even-handed approach to the control problem. Such a classification system
also makes it much simpler for law enforcement officials. Rather than focus-
ing on whether a dog fits into the breed given in the statute, law enforce-
ment officials have the freedom to seek out all statutory offenders. A similar
classification method is to allow the particular city or state to take action
against dog owners, again regardless of breed, for "terrorism" without pro-
vocation so that officials can take action against a dangerous animal before
it has a chance to cause injury to anyone.'29 Prevention is the answer.
The key to any such format would be to identify a dangerous or vicious
animal before it bites or attacks.
breed and leave it to the discretion of the individual municipalities whether pit
bull dogs posed such a threat to the safety and security of their citizens that they
bore specific mention in a statute. This solution is not truly functional and, to use
a colloquiallism, is a "cop out." There is a recognized necessity for a uniform
statewide law regarding the control of dogs. It is merely the means that the
legislature selected to reach that goal, not the goal itself, that is problematic.
128 Support for this view has been recognized in New York City where the type
of statute to control vicious dogs must be chosen. Editorial, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7,
1988, at 26.
129 Some Dogs Will No Longer Get Their Day, GovERNI-G Oct. 1987, at 10-11.
The use of the term "terrorism" was chosen as an alternative to a breed specific
statute in Aurora, Colorado because the city was reluctant to enact a statute which
would make it vulnerable to a court challenge. While use of the term "terrorism"
may be an attractive alternative to designating a specific breed, it must be noted
that that is only true provided there is more definitional material in the statute
to indicate (1) precisely what is meant by terrorism and (2) what acts of terrorism
by a dog subject the owner to the penalties of the statute. Otherwise, the statute
is vulnerable to a constitutional challenge on the grounds that the term "terrorism"
is vague and overbroad.
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Another potential solution would be the formation of a dog "court" as
a division of the county dog warden's office, to hear claims arising from
dog related problems.'" Such a court would be the main body responsible
for administering the dog law. It would take complaints from concerned
parties involving potentially dangerous or vicious dogs. Once a dog had
been adjudicated to be dangerous or vicious by the court, the owner would
then have to comply with the leash, confinement, and other requirements
of the law.
The one aspect of the new statute which serves a desirable function is
the penalties. While the penalties were more severe than many legislators
anticipated, "1 such penalties can serve a useful function. 3 2 The Humane
Society recommends that state laws involving dangerous or vicious dogs
should include penalties because they are the most effective deterrent to
dog attacks. 13 3 Owners are more likely to comply with the terms of the
statute if serious penalties are involved. Perhaps the use of dogs in the
commission of criminal offenses, such as illicit drug sales or dog-fighting,
deserves harsher penalties to further deter the use of the animals.
Another change in the statutory law necessary to control the dog prob-
lem is an upgrading of enforcement forces. Even when laws to protect the
public health and safety exist, they must be enforced to be effective. Many
enforcement officers are too overburdened by enforcing laws which con-
trol people who engage in illegal conduct to enforce animal laws and give
them any "teeth." To crack down on animal problems, enforcement agen-
cies need to be revitalized. Agencies such as the American Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) which have units authorized
to carry guns and make arrests relating to crimes against animals, need
the funding necessary to carry on operations. Such units can conduct
surveillance and develop a network of informants to get to the deeper prob-
lems that create vicious dogs, such as dog-fight promoters, drug dealers,
and others who use the dogs as part of their criminal endeavors. An ac-
tive enforcement agency creates the impression that there is a hard line
stance being taken against the problem and assures people that if they
engage in illegal behavior, they will be punished.
The initial steps have already been made in an effort to assist lawmakers
in making intelligent decisions about what types of laws will
130 Such a plan is admittedly difficult and costly to implement on a statewide
basis, but the drawbacks must be weighed against the concern for public safety
and welfare, and the need for a uniform application of the law once adopted. An
advantage of using the existing offices of the county dog wardens, is that these
offices already have a structure of individuals who are familiar with animals and
their propensities and the administration of problems that involve animals.
1 Interview with Ohio State Senator Grace Drake, R-22nd District (Dec. 29,
1987).
132 See supra note 70.
133 Some Dogs Will No Longer Get Their Day, GoVERNING Oct. 1987, at 10-11.
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best achieve their goals without relying on breed specific statutes."
Ultimately, the best source of dog control may be in a general public
awareness program to counteract some of the negative publicity certain
breeds have received in the past and to inform people that the dogs are
not vicious by nature, but are as much victims of the humans who trained
them, as the man, child, or other animal they harm. Such publicity,
however, should not only be aimed at informing the public of such general
information, but also at educating them about the law and making an ef-
fort to get the assistance of the public in counteracting the problems
associated with all breeds and those who use them for illegal purposes.
VII. PROPOSED REVISION OF THE NEW STATUTE
The best illustration of implementing the above criticisms and sugges-
tions is to rewrite a portion of the statute. Since the definitional section
of the statute which designated pit bull dogs as prima facie vicious is the
source of most criticism associated with the statute, it will serve as a useful
example. 3 5 All revisions will appear in italics. The proposed statute would
retain the dangerous/vicious distinction but would read as follows:
Sec. 955.11 (A) As used in this section:
(iXa) "Dangerous Dog" means a dog that without provocation has
engaged in menacing behavior toward the general public, any individual
person, or another animal.
(2) "Menacing Behavior" means behavior which indicates a predisposi-
tion on the part of the dog to chase or approach in either a threatening
fashion or an apparent attitude of attack, or to attempt to bite or other-
wise endanger any person while that dog is off the premises of its owner,
keeper, or harborer, or some other responsible person, or not physically
restrained or confined in a locked pen which has a top, locked fenced yard,
or other locked enclosure which has a top.
(3) "Predisposition" means that the dog has exhibited previous behavior
that would indicate to the owner, keeper, or harborer that the dog had the
propensity to engage in any of the behavior described in subsection (2).
(4) "Threatening fashion" means that a dog would cause any person
being chased or approached to reasonably believe that the dog will cause
physical injury to that person.
(5) "Vicious Dog" means a dog that, without provocation meets any
of the following criteria:
I" The International Institute of Municipal Clerks published a guide to or-
dinances dealing with dangerous and vicious dogs. The 26 page booklet offers in-
formation and sample ordinances from around the country to help states and
localities in framing dog laws. See supra note 133, at 11.
135 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.11 (Baldwin Supp. 1987).
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(i) Has killed or caused serious injury to any person; (ii) Has
caused injury, other than killing or serious injury, to any per-
son, or has killed another dog. (iii) Has previously been classified
as a dangerous animal but has continued to engage in menac-
ing behavior such that it could be considered a repeat offender
capable of engaging in one of the behaviors contained in (i) or
(ii) of this subsection if allowed to continue.
(6) "Without Provocation" means that a dog was not teased, tormented,
or abused by a person, or that the dog was not coming to the aid or the
defense of a person who was not engaged in illegal or criminal activity
and who was not using the dog as a means of carrying out such activity."'
VIII. CONCLUSION
The fate of breed specific statutes such as Ohio Revised Code section
955.11 is presently unknown. The controversy surrounding them has
resulted in numerous challenges on constitutional grounds. The resolu-
tion of these cases has led to results that are unfavorable for pit bull dog
owners but, in the eyes of legislators, are extremely favorable in terms
of the health and safety of communities. The available alternatives to breed
specific statutes appear viable as substitutes that could achieve substan-
tially similar results without alienating a portion of the citizens of a
community.
I This proposed portion of a statute is based on the current statutory format
of Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 955.11 (Baldwin Supp. 1987). It addresses only the pro-
blem of specifically mentioning pit bull dogs on the face of the statute, but does
not include any of the necessary exceptions which must be made to the definitions.
Of particular importance are those exceptions which concern the use of dogs in
the area of law enforcement, as they become satisfactory once the designation of
a specific breed is removed from the face of the statute.
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